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Secrecy and Morality in Intelligence

When I came back to Washington from my overseas assignment nine months ago, I found myself confronted with what appeared to be a beleaguered CIA. Beleaguered by several years of criticism, investigation, and adverse publicity. Yet, as I grew to know the organization and the people I realized how very fortunate I was to come to it at this particular time in our nation's history. I felt it was a moment of opportunity.

Opportunity first, because I doubt that anywhere else in the business world or in government will you find more dedicated, more capable public servants than in the Central Intelligence Agency and the other associated intelligence organizations in our country. They have an admirable record and, with this, I am confident that we have the foundation on which to rebuild public confidence which is much deserved.

The second way it is a moment of opportunity is because today, out of the crucible of this period of investigation and inquiry we are forging a new model of intelligence - an American model of intelligence. The old, traditional model of intelligence remarkably unchanged over centuries of history, is one where intelligence organizations maintained maximum secrecy and operated with a minimum of supervisory control. Nearly all foreign intelligence organizations continue to follow this pattern. The new model we are forging is singularly tailored to the

outlook, the attitudes, and the standards of our country. On the one hand, it is open, more open just like our society. On the other hand, there is more supervision, more control, much like the checks and balances that characterize our entire governmental process. Let me explain a few of the cardinal features of this new American model of intelligence.

First - Openness. Today we are attempting to share more with you, the public of the United States, than ever before. We are sharing first something about the process of intelligence, how we go about doing our work. Now, clearly we cannot share everything. Very often the reason information or how it was obtained is useful is because it is unsuspected by our potential adversaries. Publicity would vitiate its usefulness. But at the same time there is much about intelligence work that need not be kept secret and which I think both the Intelligence Community and the public would benefit by discussing openly.

For example, contrary to popular belief, a very large percentage of our effort is not involved in clandestine spying. Most of our effort is concentrated on what would be termed on any university campus, or in many major corporations, simply as research. We have thousands of people whose task is to take bits of information that have been collected - sometimes openly, sometimes clandestinely - and, much like working on a jigsaw puzzle, piece them together to make them into a picture. With this picture they can then provide an evaluation or an

estimate that will help our nation's decisionmakers better understand world events, anticipate problems, and make better decisions on behalf of you and me. This is a very ordinary but a very challenging task intellectually. It is no way spooky.

Today, in carrying out our new policy of greater openness we want to share more of the results of this kind of analysis. Each time we complete a major intelligence study today, we look it over carefully to see if it can be declassified. Whatever its classification - Secret, Top Secret, or burn before reading - we go through it and excise those portions which must remain classified. These are clues which in the hands of our enemies could jeopardize the way we acquired the information, or could endanger the life of someone who has helped us. Once these clues are removed, if there is enough substance left to be of interest and of value to the American public, we publish the study and make it available, usually through the Government Printing Office.

You may have heard that in March the CIA issued a report on the world energy prospects for the next 10 years or so. In May, a study was issued on the world steel outlook - available capacity, prospects for the future. In July, on behalf of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, we issued one on the future prospects of the Soviet economy - a rather startling change from what had been predicted in the past. Also in July, we issued a study on International Terrorism which has subsequently been

made available through the Department of Commerce to businesses operating overseas.

Now, not to exaggerate, the Intelligence Community has, of course, not been thrown open with all secrets revealed. Anyone with a cursory understanding of the international system appreciates that that would be very much to our disadvantage. Sources would evaporate, the advantage of knowing more about your adversary than he thinks you know would be lost, and a foreigner's loyalty to us would assuredly be rewarded with prison or death.

But there are real advantages to opening up within the limits of necessary secrecy. Interestingly, I believe it is going to make it easier to protect important secrets. Winston Churchill once said, if everything is classified secret, nothing is secret. Today too much information is classified.

There are also too many people running around who feel they can take it unto themselves to decide what should be classified and what should be released. They have released information which has done irreparable damage to our country in terms of damaged national relationships; in terms of expensive, technical intelligence systems compromised; in terms of lives dedicated to America and what we stand for, lost. By our releasing as much information as we can, we can help improve the quality of national debate on important issues. And, in making that contribution we also derive a benefit. Greater public exposure of the

intelligence product, generates discussion and feedback to us of attitudes toward what we are doing and good constructive criticism of how we are doing it. This is important not only because it decreases the likelihood of misunderstandings - and much of the criticism of the past derived from misunderstandings - but-also, everyone of us in authority clearly recognizes that the intelligence mechanism of the United States must be operated in ways that are compatible with the ethical and moral standards of our country. The problem with that, however, is that it is not always easy to know with certainty what those standards are. What the country would condone in intelligence operations or other governmental activities 20 years ago, it may condemn today. How will the nation look 5, 10, or 20 years from now at what we are doing today?

Unfortunately, we cannot launch a trial balloon. We can't take some proposed activity and test it out on 210 million or so Americans and expect it to remain secret. Often we either do something secretly or we just don't do it at all. That places a particular burden on all of us in the Intelligence Community. A burden to make difficult judgments as to what things we should and what things we should not do. The American model that I'm speaking of establishes controls to help us make these judgments. Let me discuss three of those controls.

The first type of control is self-control, or self-regulation. For instance, today, and for some months, we have been attempting to write a specific code of operational ethics for the Intelligence

Community. It hasn't been easy to write something that is specific enough to give genuine guidance, yet not so specific as to be totally inhibiting and prevent effectiveness. But the process of attempting to write such a code has been salutary for us. It has forced us to think more about ethical issues. It has forced us to grapple with the subtleties of these issues. Just as in business, just as in other agencies of government, ethical issues are seldom all black or all white. But in examining the many shades of gray, we must ask ourselves exactly what are the boundaries of our societal standards? To what lengths should we go to obtain information which would be useful for the decisionmakers of our country? The answers are never clear cut. It would be easy for us to simply interpret standards arbitrarily and stay right in the middle-of-the-road. Never do anything that would embarrass the United States of America were it disclosed. Never treat people of another country differently than we would treat Americans. Be as open and fair in our dealings with other countries as we believe all peoples should be treated.

Unquestionably this is how we would hope we could act. However, in many situations they represent an unrealistic ideal. We must always remember, that we are an unusually blessed people, living in an unusually open society. In an open society like ours an outsider can come in and without great effort, using only open sources, attain a good grasp of what's

going on, what our basic purposes are, the directions we are going, and what we are thinking. He comes; he reads; he looks; he talks to people; he walks down the street; and he can easily make an accurate appraisal of what the United States is about.

Unfortunately, as we all know, there are closed societies in the world today. Closed societies where you can't go and walk down the street and talk to the people. And, reading the newspapers is not very informative because they only say what the government puts in them. Yet, we have a genuine need to know what is going on in those societies. I don't think you would want your government to negotiate a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union if I could not assure you that we had some chance of feeling the pulse of the Soviet Union's political, economic, and military motives; if I didn't think there was a good chance of knowing whether or not they were abiding by the terms of such an agreement.

The problem is not limited to the military. Today we are in a economically interdependent world. What happens to the economies of the Soviet Union or the United States has ripple effects around the world. Yet, even here, closed societies of the communist bloc are not very informative. The pocketbooks of each one of us here is exposed to dangers of the economically unsound actions of other countries. We must have some intelligence capability for anticipating those events, for getting a feel for the way foreign economies are moving. But

this too is not easy. Nor is it clear cut how much of that information is of real value. Nor are the lengths to which we should go in acquiring that information well-defined. So, we must look to controls beyond the self-control which I have described.

The second type of control over the Intelligence Community is in the form of laws and formal regulations. Congress has passed a number of laws that affect intelligence operations, like, for example, the law on wiretapping. This spring the Administration went to the Congress with a revision to this wiretapping law in an effort to better protect the right to privacy of American citizens and at the same time enable the government to obtain information that may be crucial to it.

The President himself may issue very specific regulations. For example, there is a written regulation today prohibiting the Intelligence Community from counselling, planning, or carrying out an assassination.

In the next session of Congress, our recent work with Congressional leaders will culminate in a series of charters being issued for intelligence agencies. All of the intelligence operations in the CIA, the Defense Department, and elsewhere in the government, will have a specific charter which will govern their operations.

The third form of control under the American model of intelligence is called Oversight. Earlier I mentioned the impossibility of attempting full public oversight by launching trial balloons for every secret operation. While we really would

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like to have full public oversight, it simply is not practical. The substitute that has been evolving is a surrogate process of public oversight.

One of the surrogates for the American people is the President of the United States. Another is the Vice President. Both these elected officials take a very keen interest in the intelligence process and operations. I see them both regularly and they are fully aware of intelligence activities.

Another surrogate is a committee called the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which has been in existence for just over a year-and-a-half. This committee is in many respects a sounding board for us. We go to them with our problems and they feedback to us with what they feel the American people want. It is also a check on us. They hear things, they read things, they call us up, and ask us to come over and tell them what is happening and why it is happening. Through the budget process, I keep them informed of the full range of our activities. It is a very valuable line of communication between the intelligence agencies and the people of the United States.

I am very pleased that in August the House of Representatives elected to establish a corresponding committee.

I look forward to having the same point of contact, the same sounding board in the lower chamber, as we now have in the Senate.

The Intelligence Oversight Board is still another oversight surrogate. This board is comprised of three distinguished citizens: former governor Scranton, former Senator Gore, and Tom Farmer of Washington, D. C., appointed by the President for the sole task of overseeing the legality and propriety of what the Intelligence Community is doing. You, any of my employees, anyone who wants, may write to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and say that fellow Turner is doing something wrong. If they think there's any illegality in intelligence operations or that something is being done improperly, they can go directly to this Board. The Board then makes its own investigation; they may call me in and ask me what is going on; but they do it independently and report only to the President of the United States. He then decides if some action should be taken.

Another form of control is over what is called covert action. Covert action is not gathering or analyzing intelligence, it is taking actions intended to influence opinions or events in other countries without those actions being attributed to the United States. The CIA has been charged by the President over many years as the only agency in the government that will conduct covert action and continues to be required to retain that capability. It is outside the normal ambit of intelligence activities and, as you can imagine involves a high element of risk. This is where the

CIA has received the most adverse publicity. In the past, in Viet Nam for example, there was a good deal of covert activity being carried out. Today, covert activity is first, on a very, very, low scale; and second, before any covert effort is undertaken, it must be cleared by the National Security Council, the President must then indicate his approval by signature, and I must then notify eight committees of Congress.

There are some who say that all of this oversight may be overkill. Let me be candid with you. There are risks in this process. There is the risk of timidity. The more oversight over an intelligence operation the less willing individuals are to take the risks that operation may entail. Maybe too few risks will be taken for the long term good of our country. When you sit around a conference table with other members of a committee, it is easy to say, no, that's too risky, let's not do it. It is much more difficult to stand alone in a group and say yes, for the long term needs of the country, we require that information, we should take that risk.

The second risk is that there may be a security leak. As you proliferate the number of people with access to information about intelligence operations in order to conduct the oversight process, you run the risk of somebody saying something that he should not.

In conclusion, you should know that I feel very confident that today we are beginning to find the balance between the risks of too much oversight on the one hand and necessary control on

the other. There is every good prospect that a relatively stable balance can be established over these next 2 or 3 years as we shake down this process and as we mature into this new American model of intelligence. I believe we will develop ways of maintaining that necessary level of secrecy while at the same time conducting intelligence operations only in ways that will strengthen our open and free society.

Thank you very much. I would be happy to entertain your questions.

ADDRESS BY ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

NORTH SHORE UNITARIAN CHURCH

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

13 NOVEMBER 1977

I'm really very pleased to be back here on the North Shore of Chicago-land. I'm sure that all of you who live here appreciate the privileges you have. I look back on the privilege I had of being raised here; it has meant a lot to me ever since. I've lived in a lot of other places across this country and around the world, but I've never seen anywhere that I thought was better for raising a family or putting down roots.

Speaking of roots, my professional roots when I left here were with the United States Navy until just nine months ago when the President of the United States uprooted me and decided that I should become the nation's number one spook. When I came back to Washington from my overseas assignment nine months ago to undertake this new work, I found myself confronted with what appeared to be a beleaguered CIA, beleaguered by several years of criticism, investigation, adverse publicity. Yet as I began to know the organization, I came to feel very fortunate to come to it at this particular time in our nation's history. I felt it was a moment of opportunity, opportunity first because I have gotten to know the people there. I can say to you with great confidence that I doubt that anywhere else in the business world or in government will you find more dedicated, more capable public servants than in the Central Intelligence Agency and the other associated intelligence organizations in our country. They have an admirable record, and with this I am confident that we have the foundation on which to rebuild public confidence which is much deserved.

The second way it is a moment of opportunity is because I believe that today, out of the crucible of this period of investigations and inquiry, we are forging a new model of intelligence, uniquely an American model of intelligence. The old, the traditional model of intelligence is one where the intelligence organizations maintained maximum secrecy and operated with a minimum of supervisory control. The new model that we are forging is uniquely tailored to the outlooks, the attitudes, and the standards of our country. On the one hand it is open, more open just like our society. On the other hand there is more supervision, more control, just like the checks and balances that characterize our entire governmental process. Now let me explain to you, if I may, a few of the cardinal features of this new American model of intelligence.

First - openness. We are today attempting to share more with you--the public of the United States--than perhaps ever before in the history of our intelligence operations. We are sharing something about the process of intelligence, how we go about doing our business. Now, clearly there are areas here we simply cannot share or they would evaporate and go away. But on the other hand there are lots of things about what we do that we would like people to know more about. To know more, for instance, about the fact that a very large percentage of our effort is not in spying. It's not in doing clandestine things. It's in doing what would be termed on any university campus, or in many major corporations, simply research. We have thousands of people whose task it is to take bits of information that we collect, sometimes openly, sometimes clandestinely, and piece them together to make them fit into a picture puzzle, to provide an evaluation, an estimate that will help the decisionmakers of our country come to better decisions on behalf of you and of me. This is a very ordinary but a very intellectually challenging assignment. It is not spooky.

Today, in our policy of greater openness, we are trying to share more with you the results of this kind of analysis, this kind of estimating. Every time we do a major intelligence study today, we look back at it and see the label on the cover where it may say secret, top secret, or burn before reading. Whatever it may be, we go through it and we excise those portions which must remain classified to protect our national interests. Then we say to ourselves, is there enough left, is there enough substance here to be of interest and of value and importance to the American public. If there is, we publish it and make it available. You may have heard in March we issued a report on the world energy prospects for the next 10 years. In May we issued one on the world steel outlook, whether it is over-capacity, whether it is under-capacity. In July, on behalf of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, we issued one on the future prospects of the Soviet economy, a rather startling change on what had been predicted in the past.

Now, I will not overdo this. I don't want to let you think we are letting all the secrets out of the bag--I'm sure you wouldn't want us to. If we let out too much, we will lose our sources of information--they would dry up. If we let out too much we would deprive those decisionmakers of important advantages in having inside information on which to base their decisions. But there are, I believe, real advantages to us in opening up within the limits of necessary secrecy. Interestingly, I believe it is going to make it easier to protect our important secrets. Winston Churchill once said if everything is classified secret, nothing is secret. We have too much classified information today. But we also have too many people running around who feel they can take it onto themselves to decide what should be classified and what should be released. They have released information which has done great damage to our

country, So I hope that by narrowing the purpose of classified information, by releasing as much as we possibly can without harming our national interests, we will protect and respect that which remains classified much more.

Sharing with the public has other advantages. I hope that it has the advantage of giving us a better informed electorate. What is more important to the foundation of democracy in this country? If we, by our releasing information for which you the taxpayers have paid, can contribute to improving the quality of national debate on important issues, I hope we will be providing all of you a service. And in providing that service we derive a benefit, we derive the benefit of staying in closer touch with the American public. This is important to us, important because we don't want misunderstandings. Much of the criticism of the past was misunderstandings and we don't want those to occur again. But also, everyone of us in authority in the intelligence world of our country today clearly recognizes that we must operate our intelligence mechanism in ways that are acceptable to the ethical and moral standards of our country.

So, put yourself in our shoes. It's not easy to devise what those standards are, what we are expected to live up to, because what the country would accept in intelligence operations or other governmental activities twenty years ago perhaps it may not accept today. What was condoned then may be condemned today. We have some difficulty finding just what those standards are today and predicting how they will look in retrospect five, ten and twenty years from now. We have particular difficulty in our business because we cannot go launch trial balloons. We can't take some proposed secret operation and test it out on a million or so Americans and expect it to remain secret. We either do it in a

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secret way or we just don't do it at all. That places on all of us in the Intelligence Community a particular burden, the burden to make difficult judgments as to what things we should and what things we should not do.

Now the new American model that I'm speaking of establishes controls for how these judgments are made. Let me discuss three of those types of controls.

First I would say is self-control, or self-regulation. For instance, today and for some months we have been attempting to write a specific code of ethics for the Intelligence Community. It hasn't been easy. It hasn't been easy to write something that is specific enough to give genuine guidance to our people, yet not so specific as to be totally inhibiting and prevent effectiveness. But the process of attempting to write a code of ethics has been salutary for us, it has forced us to think more about the ethical issues, it has forced us to wrestle with these issues to recognize that, just as in business, just as in other walks of government, the ethical issues are seldom all black or all white. But we ask ourselves what standards we should set as to the lengths we will go to obtain information for the decision-makers of our country. We aren't really facing black and white, clear-cut easy decisions. It would be easy for us to simply establish a standard that says, don't ever do anything that would embarrass the United States of America were it disclosed. Or a standard that says, don't ever treat people of another country differently than you would treat Americans, or a standard that says, treat other countries as openly and as fairly as we believe in our society that people in other countries should be treated.

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But we have to remember that we are blessed because we live in an open society. In an open society an outsider can come in and he can get a good feel, a good grasp of what's going on, what our basic purposes are, the directions we are going, and what the thinking of the people is. He comes; he reads; he looks; he talks to the people; he walks down the street; and he makes a good appraisal of what the United States is watching.

Unfortunately, as we well know, there are closed societies in the world today, closed societies where you don't go and walk down the street and talk to the people, and read newspapers which are not very informative. Yet, we have genuine need of knowing what's going on in many of those closed societies. Would you want us today, your government, to be out there negotiating a new strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, if I could not assure you that I thought we had some chance of feeling the pulse of the Soviet Union's political, economic and military intentions, some chance of understanding whether they are adhering to the terms we will establish with them at the next SALT agreement?

And the problem is not limited to military things. Today we are in a world of growing economic interdependence. What happens in the economy of the Soviet Union or the United States has ripple effects across the world horizons. Yet, even here closed societies of the Communist Bloc are not very informative about their economic undertakings. And each one of us here, in this room, is exposed to dangers to our economy, to our pocketbooks, to our taxes, as a result of actions of these other countries that are unexpected and unanticipated. So again I believe we must have some intelligence capabilities for anticipating those events, for getting a feel for the directions they are going in their economy. But this is not easy, it's not clear-cut as to how much of that information is of real value, to what extremes, to what limits we should go in obtaining it. So we have arrived at more controls than the self-control I have just described.

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The second type of control is law and regulation. Congress has passed a number of laws that affect intelligence operations. There is, for instance, a law on wiretapping of United States citizens' communications. On the one hand, this spring the Administration went to the Congress with their revision to the wiretapping law in an effort to find an even better balance in protecting the rights of privacy of American citizens. On the other hand, leaving open some opportunity for the government to obtain information that may be critical to it. When needed the President issues very specific regulations. For instance, there is one in writing today which governs all of us in the Intelligence Community. It says, thou shall not plan or commit assassinations. For the next session of Congress we have worked with the Congressional leaders on a program that will lead to what we will call charters for intelligence. All of our intelligence operations in the CIA, in the Defense Department, elsewhere in the government will have a specific charter which will lay out certain do's and don't's that will govern these operations.

And then we have the third form of control under the American model of intelligence which I call oversight. Back at the beginning I mentioned the difficulty we have with really giving good public oversight and watching trial balloons about secret operations. What has been evolving as a substitute for full public oversight, the kind that pervades our political process and which we would like to have but simply cannot from a practical standpoint, is what I call a surrogate process of public oversight. One of the surrogates is the President of the United States and another is the Vice President. They have, since January 20th, taken a very keen interest in our intelligence process and operations. Another surrogate is a committee called the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which has been in

existence for just a year and a half. Senator Adlai Stevenson of our state is a member of that committee and I particularly enjoy working with him. Just yesterday morning he called me with a particular suggestion of real value to me. This committee is a sounding board for us. We go to them with our problems and get feedback as to what they feel the American people want. It's a check on us. They inquire, they hear things, they read things, they call us up and say come over and tell us what's happening and why this is going on. It's a very valuable line of communication between the intelligence world and the United States representatives of the people on Capitol Hill. I'm very pleased that in August the House of Representatives elected to establish a corresponding oversight committee. I'm equally pleased that your own Representative, Robert McClory, is a member of that. I particularly enjoy working with him as well. We look forward to having that same point of contact, the same sounding board in the lower chamber.

Still another oversight surrogate that we have is something called the Intelligence Oversight Board. This consists of three distinguished citizens; ex-Governor Scranton, ex-Senator Gore and Mr. Tom Farmer of Washington, D.C. They are appointed by the President for the sole task of looking into the legality and propriety of the way we are operating the Intelligence Community. You, any of my employees, anyone who wants to, may write to the Intelligence Oversight Board and say that fellow Turner is really messing things up. They don't have to go through me if they work for me, they can go right to this Board if they think there's any illegality, anything being done improperly. The Board then makes its own investigation, they call me in and ask me what in the world is going on, but they do it independently and report only to the President of the United States, and he decides if some action should be taken as a result.

Another form of control is exercised over what we call covert action. Let me describe very briefly what I mean by this terminology. Covert action is not really intelligence. It is actions taken intended to influence opinions or events in foreign countries without anybody knowing whose point of view it is. This is where CIA has gotten into the most adverse publicity, because it happens that the CIA has been charged by the President over many years as the only agency in the government that will conduct covert action. It's outside the intelligence business, and there are not that many cases. It's on a very, very low scale today. But today as contrasted with the past, covert action, an effort to influence events elsewhere in the world, that is going to be undertaken must be cleared by the National Security Council. The President must place his signature indicating that he wants this done, and I must then go and notify the appropriate committees of the Congress. This is oversight.

Now there are some people that say that all of this oversight may be overkill. Let me be candid with you--there are risks in this process. There is the risk of timidity. There is the risk that as you conduct more and more oversight over this intelligence operation, you will take less and less risks, maybe too few risks for the long-term benefit of our country. It is easy when you sit around the table with a member of a committee and say, gee, that's too much risk, let's not do that. It is more difficult to stand up and be counted, to say, yes, the long-term needs of the country require that you obtain that information. We take that risk.

There is a second risk and that's of security leaks. As you proliferate the number of people who have access to information about our intelligence in order to conduct the oversight process, we run the risk of somebody inadvertently saying something that he shouldn't say.

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I believe it will be two or three years before we settle the balance between these risks of timidity and security leaks and the proper amount of oversight.

In conclusion, I want you to know that I feel very confident today that we will find a satisfactory balance in these next two or three years as we shake down this process, as we mature to this new American model of intelligence. I believe we will and have developed ways of maintaining that necessary level of secrecy, while at the same time conducting your intelligence operations only in ways that will strengthen our open and free society.

I appreciate having been raised here.

Since leaving Chicagoland--lived in lots interesting places

Raise family--roots

My professional roots Navy upturned 9 months ago

Interveneing months exciting

9 months ago came to a beleaguered organization in CIA

Investigated--attacked

Fortunate--came at moment opportunity--2 reasons

1. Have in CIA and other intelligence agencies-- one finest groups
of dedicated public servants--record admirable--foundation--
rebuild confidence.

2. Moment when out of the past investigations is emerging

entirely new model of intelligence--American---

Old model--maximum secrecy, agencies and minimum supervision

New model uniquely sculpted to characteristics of our country

one hand --more open like our society

other hand--less independent, more supervised like the

checks and balances in our governmental system--

Let me explain cardinal features

1. Openness--

sharing more--process clearly cannot tell all

Like Know-- large % not spying --simply research.

Sharing more of analysis

check each study --unclassify?

Studies -- Soviet economy

Don't over ~~Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B0154R002700280001-6~~

lose sources

lose advantages

Are advantages

opening up within these limits

1. Protect secrets -

2. Share with public

3. Keep in touch with public

Important -- recognize must operate intelligence mechanism ways

acceptable ethical / moral standards society

1. Difficult - changing

2. Cannot test on public

Burden

Difficult judgements -- *American model establishes* controls -- 3 types

1st type control must be self control -- regulation derives from

~~our interpretation what nation wants from intelligence.~~

Derives efforts to write code ethics -- not easy

Specific enough to be guidance but not tie in knots

Process doing it important -- makes wrestle with issues

recognize not black and white

No standard -- ~~what info worth what risks obtain~~ to what lengths

~~should let pragmatism overrule idealism~~

Easy in ~~either direction -- For instance -- Forget -- live in open society~~
DON'T EMBARRASS - TREAT CITIZENS
OPEN SOCIETY
closed societies

openly is curbed ability obtain information

2nd form controls in addition self scrutiny -- specific laws and

regulations

~~Still how far we will go for such info not alone our decision.~~

wiretaps -- US citizens

Assassination

Explicit written guidance -- next session Congress -- charters

3rd Controls Oversight - *SURROGATE*

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President

Congress

Stevenson and Mc Clory

Risks

Timidity

Leaks

2 - 3 years balance *model* **RISK/OVERSIGHT**

Out this confident have evolved ways to maintain secrecy
while still conducting intelligence operations in ways
will only strengthen our open *free* society.

26 October 1977

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St. John's Forum

Washington, D. C.

1000, Sunday, 6 November 1977

North Shore Unitarian Church

Chicago, Ill.

1900-2100, Sunday, 13 November 1977

SECRECY AND MORALITY IN INTELLIGENCE

A. Past seven months

- looking at/explaining past intel activities
- not exercise in burying/praising past
- value of looking at past: makes you want to find ways to ensure mistakes/impressions of mistakes don't reoccur. All we must do rest on a solid foundation of the ethical/moral values of our nation.

B. Ethics

- Would like to write a formal code of ethics for the IC. Not an effort to restrict action, instead to try to help. We all have own personal code, but organizations must have standards too. Unexpressed, they can only be assumed. It really isn't fair to our employees to expect them to live up to standards which have not been made explicit.

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- Problems:

1. Values hard to pin down; interpretations of national ethics change with time and circumstance.
2. Difficult to test acceptability of secret operations through public opinion. Consequently, must attempt to judge what the nation wants today and will continue to approve tomorrow.

- In doing so, whether or not a formal code of ethics can be written, the reassessment of our operations and their measurement against today's expressed ethics is worthwhile because:

- a. it sensitizes the whole IC to the issues, and
- b. it encourages public understanding of the real problems involved in trying to run an intelligence organization in accordance with the Marquis of Queensbury rules.

We do have some guidelines however - for instance on the

1. Domestic side; that is, activities involving U.S. citizens, in U.S.A., have easiest time.

- Most are closely controlled by law, e.g., new wiretap legislation. I'm sure you feel as I do - don't want to go to jail any more than any other citizen.

- In other cases we are regulated by Presidential order: Assassinations.

- Finally, have our own regulations:

a. Media

Today - no paid contractual relationships with accredited American media are permitted. We don't use them as agents. However, do respect journalists as citizens. They have right to assist the government by passing on observations/information if they so desire. Nothing improper. Injurious freedom? press sharing -

b. Clergy/missionaries

No secret, paid or unpaid, contractual relationships are permitted. None exist.

c. Academia

Do have paid relationships - e.g., engage professors to write or do research for us. Afraid, however, the popular but unreasonable view in some areas of academe that any relationship between the academic and intel communities is improper. This has led to unhealthy reduction in the amount of contact.

I hope to expand those relationships. Harvard guidelines, dialogue with Harvard/Amherst; speaking on campuses.

phone calls, or Korean payments to U.S. Congressmen, but uncomfortable about the basis for their outrage for fear CIA engages in equivalent practices in the Soviet Union and Korea, are confused.

- Clandestine gathering of information is a tool used sparingly. There is always a necessity for ascertaining that this information is not available through overt or less risky sources. I assure you, however, that with all the wonderful new technical means we have today clandestine spying is still a vital arrow in our quiver of intelligence gathering techniques.

- To what lengths, however, should we go in pursuing information? To what limits should pragmatism override idealism? On whose judgment should we depend? Recall - operate largely in secret,

public scrutiny cannot be our guide; we must find a surrogate process of public oversight. That has been one major result of past several years of scrutiny and criticism

- Oversight

- (1) Personal interest of President/VP
 - (2) Senate Select Committee
 - relations with IC are close and excellent
 - (3) New House Committee
 - benefits of 1 committee in House
and 1 in Senate
 - (4) Legal requirement for approval for
covert operations
 - (5) IOB
- Risk in all of this:
- (1) Timidity - least common denominator
 - (2) Security leaks
- But I believe in balance - next few years critical

C. Limits on Public Oversight - More sharing - more in touch -
within limits of secrecy

Both - process of intelligence - how to do it - And - Product -
Energy - Soviet Economy

Even within limits - Benefits - most important relates to fact
values are hard to pin down; changing - hence must stay in touch
with society, not only through Congress, elected executive branch
but also own contact with public.

- Where does this all lead?

- New American model of intelligence

-British model - Secrecy

-American model - balance openness vs secrecy

- 8 -

Out this balance - 2 things

- (1) Greater input from public to
standards expect IC
- (2) Greater input from IC to public
contributing to a more informed
debate on major issues

This kind of dialogue is the essence of the democratic process.